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Abstract— The emergence of RFID applications has huge 
influence to become pervasive in modern life. However the 
vulnerability of the transmission through the air and the unique 
identification number of RFID tag are the drawbacks that impact 
the popularity of RFID technology. In this paper, a mutual 
authentication protocol is proposed based on the challenge – 
response model. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is 
used as a cryptographic primitive to secure the data. The 
experimental works are carried out to validate the protocol in 
term of security and privacy. The timing analysis is also 
presented and applied to a case study of conveyor belt system. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Recently Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems 
have been becoming popular and aiming to be ubiquitously 
applied in many areas including library, banking, logistics, 
transportation, manufacturing, supply chain system, military 
etc. Some large corporations who have deployed this 
technology are Wal-Mart, Procter and Gamble, and the United 
State Department of Defense [1] etc. 
A RFID tag can be read as long as the item is within the 
range of the reader without requiring the line-of-sight operation 
as bar code technology. However, one of the biggest 
difficulties to the adoption of RFID is the lack of security and 
privacy. There is little security on the RFID tags or during the 
communication with reader which causes the RFID system 
vulnerable to many types of attacks e.g. information leakage, 
replay, denial of service [2], [3]. 
Many authentication protocols have been proposed to 
enhance the robustness of a RFID system. Some of them were 
developed based on cipher algorithms such as Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) or Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
(ECC) [4], [5], [6], [7]. Some utilised the hash-based 
algorithm, pseudo random number generator, Cyclic 
Redundancy Check (CRC) function and/or some ExOR and 
rotation operations [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]. Normally, cipher-
based approaches are not preferred for passive tag because of 
its high computational cost and the large hardware area. 
However, with the advances in technology, it is feasible to 
embed the cipher engine on the passive tags but still guarantee 
the low tag’s cost [5]. 
The aim of this paper is to develop a protocol to provide a 
strong, high security and trustful authentication scheme which 
can protect against most of well-known RFID system attacks. 
Thus, a novel mutual authentication protocol based on AES 
primitives and challenge – response method is proposed. The 
symmetric block cipher AES-128 is utilised in this proposal 
because it has been standardised and proved to be secure [13].  
The rest of the paper is organised in six parts from section 
II to section VII. Section II briefly introduces the recent works. 
Section III proposes the novel protocol. In section IV, the 
analyses of the protocol in term of security and privacy are 
presented. Section V provides some experimental results. And 
section VI introduces a case study on conveyor belt system. 
The last section, section VII, is the conclusion of the paper. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
A. RFID security proposals 
There are the number of researches to address RFID 
security and privacy issues.  This paper roughly categorises 
them into two categories: cipher-based protocols which are 
developed on AES or ECC algorithms and hash-based 
protocols and others which are based on hash functions 
and/or some simple operators such as ExOR, rotation etc. 
1) Cipher-based proposals 
 A strong authentication for RFID systems is introduced in 
[5] by implementing one-way encryption AES algorithm on 
RFID passive tag. A modified communication method between 
the reader and tag is also proposed in order to satisfy the strict 
timing requirement. However, this research reveals a 
possibility for the adversary to achieve the shared key of the 
AES encryption block [7]. In addition, the identical challenge 
always results in the identical cipher response which causes it 
to be susceptible to replay attack and tag clone. For example, 
assuming the challenge is the 16-bit output of Pseudo Random 
Number Generator [14], it is feasible for attackers to collect a 
database of 65536 entries to impersonate the legitimate devices 
to obtain the authentication. 
Extending from the research of [5], [7] offers an advanced 
mutual authentication using the AES algorithm as a 
cryptographic primitive. The main issue of this protocol is easy 
to lose the synchronisation between the reader and the tag if the 
response from tag is blocked. Another security issue of this 
research is the man in the middle attack [6]. 
[4] develops a mutual authentication protocol based on 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) which is an asymmetric 
cryptographic algorithm. However, it is susceptible to DOS 
attack. The attackers can modify the counter value in the 
message sent from the server to the tag by a much larger value 
in order to deceive the tag into updating it. In next 
authentication, because the counter value in the tag is greater 
than the one the server sends, the tag terminates the 
authentication process right away. 
2) Hash-based proposals and others 
[11] proposed a mutual authentication protocol for passive 
tag which is based on cryptographic hash functions. A method 
to prevent the desynchronisation between a reader and a tag 
was proposed as well. This proposal however might disclose 
the issues of tracking, tag impersonation and the DOS attack 
[15]. 
Another hash-based two-way authentication scheme which 
employs Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) and Pseudo 
Random Number Generator (PRNG) function was presented in 
[9]. Although it was claimed to be robust, the attackers are still 
able to track the tag due to its identical response. Furthermore, 
the replay attack and tag impersonation can be carried out to 
compromise the valid reader. For example, the attackers 
possibly play on the response from the tag embedded in the 
cheap product and then replay that to the standard item. 
[12] proposed a scheme for RFID system conforming to 
EPC Class 1 Generation 2 specifications. However, [16] has 
pointed out many security failures in this protocol.  Moreover, 
the DOS attack can be employed to desynchronise the database 
server and the tag [10]. [16] has also indicated the possibility of 
auto-desynchronisation at backend database up to 0.93 if the 
population of tags is greater than 2
18
 tags. 
To overcome the security issues of [12], [10] enhanced the 
scheme to defend against DOS attack, replay attack, forward 
secrecy and privacy concern. However, [17] and [8] claimed 
that this proposed protocol is not invulnerable due to the 
insufficient size of the secure keys. Consequently, it is 
susceptible to Tag/Reader impersonation attack and 
desynchronisation as [17] also claimed. 
III. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
A. Assumptions 
 A tag has the AES-128 encrypting block on-board 
proposed in [26]. 
 A reader and database server can perform AES-128 
encryption and decryption. 
 The channel between the reader and tag, the reader and 
backend database are vulnerable. 
B. Initialisation phase 
At the beginning, the backend database, the reader and the 
tag have the same shared key K. The seed s of each tag is 
stored on the server and on the rewriteable memory of tag. The 
ID is placed in tag’s read-only memory and server as well. In 
addition, the server and reader keep the reader identification 
number IDR for reader authentication purpose. 
C. Authentication phase 
The authentication phase is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. The proposed protocol 
 Step 1: Query 
Initially, the server generates EK(s IDR) and sends to the 
reader. The reader will decrypt this value to obtain the seed s 
by performing s=IDR (IDR s). Afterward, reader encrypts the 
seed s and forward to the queried tag. 
 Step2: Reader-to-Tag authentication 
On receiving EK(s), the tag employs the on-board AES 
encrypting block to produce its own E
*
K(s) and then check 
whether E
*
K(s)=EK(s) holds. If not, the tag keeps quiet. On the 
contrary, tag updates the seed s by s
*
=K EK(s) and again 
performs AES encrypting block to compute EK(s
*
ID) in order 
to convey to the reader. 
 Step 3: Tag-to-Reader authentication 
Upon obtaining EK(s
*
ID), the reader will pass it to the 
backend database to decrypt it. The decrypted value s
*
ID is 
used to extract the tag’s ID by carrying out the simple 
operation ID = K EK(s (s
*
 ID). Then this ID is verified by 
comparing with the ID existing in database to check whether 
this tag is legally acceptable or not. If the mismatch occurs, the 
server discards any data it has received and declines the 
authentication of the tag. Oppositely, the server updates the 
seed value of reader by s
*
=K EK(s) to guarantee the 
synchronisation of the system. 
IV. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSES 
A. Information leakage 
Due to the insufficient protections and unreliable security 
levels, the data transmitted through the air are easily 
compromised. In this protocol, there are two messages 
interchanged between the reader and the tag. However, these 
sensitive data are encrypted by AES-128 cryptographic block. 
The attackers cannot get the plaintext or the raw data. So the 
information leakage is evitable. 
B. Tag tracking and tracing 
For even EPC or IEEE standard, RFID tag is designed to 
have a unique number which can be tracked in range of any 
readers. However, this protocol provides the mechanism that 
whenever the counterfeit reader queries the tag, the tag does 
not send any response back. Consequently, the tracking and 
tracing privacy is secure in this protocol. 
C. Tag clone 
In theory, there is no tag which has similar unique identifier 
number to another one. However, adversaries can replicate the 
forged tag without much effort and expense [18]. To conduct 
the tag clone attack, the attackers have to obtain the key K, 
seed s and the ID of the tag. However, these shared data are 
kept safely and privately in the backend database and inside the 
tag; the attackers have no information to perform the same 
encryption block to acquire the authentication. 
D. Man-in-the-middleattack 
The adversative readers can impersonate the valid one in 
order to intercept, change and obtain the messages going 
between the parties which they need. In the proposed protocol, 
before querying the tag, the server sends the message 
EK(s IDR) to the reader. Because only valid reader has the key 
K to decrypt this cipher text, there is no possibility for 
attackers’ readers to achieve the seed s in order to 
communicate with the tag. Thus the man-in-the-middle attack 
can be avoided. 
E. DOS(Denial of Service) attack 
It affects any wireless communication e.g. WiFi, RFID etc. 
by obstructing or intercepting the wireless signal that causes 
loss of synchronisation among the devices. Let us assume the 
scenario in which the response EK(s ID) is intercepted by the 
adversary. Because the reader has not got the response from the 
tag, it does not update its seed. In the next authentication, 
reader sends EK(s) to challenge the tag. But the seed in tag now 
is s
*
=K EK(s), therefore, EK(s)=EK(s
*
) is not satisfied and the 
tag keeps quiet. So the solution is that reader will attempt with 
EK(K EK(s)). At this attempt, the synchronisation is re-
established. Hence, the proposed protocol is insusceptible to 
DOS attack. 
F. Replay attack 
In replay attack, the adversaries stand in the middle of 
communication channel to duplicate the valid transmission 
which will be fraudulently repeated later. However, the seed s 
is automatically updated after each successful authentication 
session. This leads to the fact that the cipher text EK(s) changes 
in every authentication cycle. Thus, the attackers cannot utilise 
the former data in order to deceive the authorised reader or tag 
to overcome the authentication process. 
Overall, the proposed protocol is able to protect against 
many types of the known attacks. The comparison with other 
researches is shown in Table I to have a general view of the 
robustness of this protocol. 
V. SIMULATION AND VALIDATION 
The simulation is executed on a computer with Intel T3200 
2GHz processor, 2GB of Ram memory on Windows 7 
Ultimate. The C programming language has been used to 
develop the simulations. The AES core is the open source 
program designed by Niyaz PK [19]. 
TABLE I. COMPARISONS IN TERM OF SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
 [5] [7] [11] [9] [12] [10] Proposed 
protocol 
Information leakage        
Tag tracking and tracing        
Tag clone        
Denial Of Service 
(DOS)/Desynchronisation 
       
Replay        
Mutual authentication        
: fully satisfied; : not satisfied; : partially satisfied as assumption 
A. Performance analysis 
In this proposed protocol, the messages transmitted on the 
channel are always encrypted. However, the adversaries can 
play brute-force attack (BFA) to attempt to get the answer from 
the tag. But since the size of the message is 128 bits, it is not 
feasible to perform BFA entirely with all the possible cases 
(more than 3x10
38
). Therefore, the simulation will randomly 
pick up an amount of random 128-bit input vectors (it is called 
sub-BFA) in order to verify the possibility of unintentional 
matches. The results are shown in Figure 2. 
  
Figure 2 Time taken for sub brute force attack 
Another simulation is conducted to measure the average 
time to perform one typical AES-128 encrypting operation. It is 
shown that it takes about 37µs to complete. 
From the simulation results, the protocol is robust to brute-
force attack. And in case the server desynchronises, it takes just 
a few seconds to perform the AES encrypting computations to 
obtain the synchronisation. 
B. Timing analysis 
1) Timing components 
In this section, the minimum and maximum time 
requirements of the communication among the server, the 
reader and the tag are analysed. The time complexity is 
calculated based on the parameters in [14]. The timing model is 
shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Timing model 
In which: 
 Ts, Tr, Tt : time for the database server, reader and tag to 
perform the AES algorithm respectively. 
Tc : time to transfer 128-bit message from the 
database to the reader through high-speed USB cable 
Tr/t, Tt/r : time to transmit 128-bit message from the reader 
to the tag and from the reader to the tag respectively. 
The values of Ts, Tr, Tt and Tc can vary depending on the 
configuration of the server, reader, tag and the length of the 
cable, respectively. 
2) Assumptions 
 Ts, Tr, Tt and Tc are assumed to be constants. 
 The computational times for AES encryption and 
decryption are the same. 
3) The minimum and maximum values 
Figure 4 shows the timing details of communication 
between the reader and the tag. 
 
Figure 4. Time of reader & tag communication 
In which: 
Tpu : time for tag to power-up 
T1, T2 : time from reader transmission to tag response 
and from tag response to reader transmission respectively 
T3, T4 : time to transmit 128-bit message from the reader 
to tag and from the tag to reader 
Let T be the total time of an authentication cycle. 
 
T = Tdatabase→tag + Ttag→database 
= (Ts + Tc + Tr + Tr/t + Tt) +(Tt + Tt/r + Tr + Tc + Ts) (1) 
In tag-to-database direction, the value Tr is 0 because the 
reader just transfers the tag’s response to the database without 
performing any AES operation. 
Therefore, (1) can be written as (2). 
T = 2 x (Ts + Tc + Tt) + Tr + (Tpu + T1 + T2 + T3 + T4) (2) 
4) Ts & Tr 
The database requires one AES operation in either 
database-to-tag or tag-to-database authentication. According to 
section V.A, the time requirement to perform one AES 
encrypting function is about 37µs, therefore Ts = 37µs.  
The reader requires two AES operations on the way from 
the database to tag. Based on the assumptions presented in 
section V.B.2), Tr can be presented by (3). 
  Tr = 2 x 37 = 74 s (3) 
5) Tt 
The AES encrypting operation at the tag takes 356 clock 
cycles at the frequency of 100 KHz [20]. So Tt is calculated as 
below. 
 Tt = 356 x 
310100
1 = 3560 s (4) 
6) Tc 
Tc is computed by adding the time of transferring 128 bits 
from the server to the reader and the delay of the cable. 
Because the USB 2.0 can transfer at 480 Mbps and the cable 
delay is 26 s [21]. So the value of Tc is: 
 
Tc = 128 x 
610480
1 + 26 s = 29.276 s (5) 
7) Tpu 
[14] does not define the minimum of Tpu, it only indicates 
the maximal value of 1500µs for powering up the tag. 
Therefore, let us assume the min(Tpu) = max(Tpu) = 1500 µs. 
8) T1 
[14] has given the equation to compute T1 as (6). 
max(RTcal, 10Tpri)x(1 - FT)-2 s≤T1≤max(RTcal, 
10Tpri) 
(6) 
To calculate RTcal and Tpri, some values are given from 
[14] such as 6.25 s≤Tari≤25 s, 2.5Tari≤RTcal≤3.0Tari, 
1.1RTcal≤TRcal≤3RTcal, BLF =
TRcal
DR , Tpri=
BLF
1
. 
 Therefore, the minimum and maximum values for RTcal 
and TRcal can be expressed in (7). 
min(RTcal) = 15.625 s; max(RTcal) = 75 s 
min(TRcal) = 17.1875 s; max(TRcal) = 225 s 
(7) 
Based on the minimum and maximum values of TRcal, the 
values of BLF and Tpri can be found according to [14]. 
max(BLF) = 465KHz; min(BLF) = 95KHz 
min(Tpri) = 
310465
1
= 2.15 s; FT = 19% 
max(Tpri) = 
31095
1
= 10.53 s; FT = 5% 
(8) 
Hence the minimum and maximum values of T1 can be 
derived from (6) as (9) and (10), respectively. 
 
min(T1) = min(max(RTcal, 10Tpri) x (1 - FT) - 2 s) 
= max(min(RTcal), 10 x min(Tpri))) x (1 - FT) - 2 s 
= 15.415 s 
(9) 
 
max(T1) = max(max(RTcal, 10Tpri)) 
= max(max(RTcal), 10 x max(Tpri)) = 105.3 s 
(10) 
9) T2 
The equation used to calculate T2 is referred from [14]. 
3Tpri  T2  20Tpri 
Therefore, the minimum and maximum values of T2 can be 
computed as (11). 
min(T2) = 3 x min(Tpri) = 6.45 s 
max(T2) = 20 x max(Tpri) = 210.06 s 
(11) 
10) T3 & T4 
In the reader-to-tag transmission, the reader starts signalling 
with either a preamble or a frame-sync as specified in [14]. 
This investigation assumes that the reader uses the frame sync 
which includes 3 components: delimiter=12.5µs; data-0=1Tari; 
RTcal [14]. The 128-bit data are sent afterward. At the end of 
the signalling either 2-bit 00 or 11 indicates the end of a 
communication. On the other hand, the tag starts the tag-to-
reader signalling with a 6-bit preamble, then 128-bit data and 
2-bit end of signalling. 
The minimum and maximum values of T3 are shown in 
(12) and (13) at the data rate of 465 KHz and 95 KHz 
respectively. 
min(T3)  =  tdelimiter + min(1Tari) + min(RTcal) + min t130 bits 
= 12.5 + 6.25 + 15.625 + 6
3
10
10465
130 = 
313.94µs 
(12) 
max(T3) = tdelimiter + max(1Tari) + max(RTcal) + max t130 bits 
= 12.5 + 25 + 75 + 6
3
10
1095
130 = 1480.92µs 
(13) 
Likewise, the minimum and maximum values of T4 are 
computed as (14) and (15). 
min(T4) = min t136 bits  = s47.29210
10465
21286 6
3
 (14) 
max(T4) = max t136 bits s58.143110
1095
21286 6
3
 (15) 
Finally, deriving from (2) and the calculations above, the 
minimum and maximum values of T now can be resulted as 
(16) and (17). 
min(T) = 2 x (Ts + Tc + Tt) + Tr + min(Tpu) + 
min(T1) + min(T2) + min(T3) + min(T4)  0.008s 
(16) 
max(T)  = 2 x (Ts + Tc + Tt) + Tr + max(Tpu) + 
max(T1) + max(T2) + max(T3) + max(T4)  0.011s 
(17) 
VI. CASE STUDY: CONVEYOR BELT SYSTEM 
The analysis and performance explained in section V.B are 
applied to estimate the maximum number of attempts for 
resynchronisation to a typical belt system as in Figure 5. The 
items with RFID tags are moving evenly from position A to 
position B on the conveyor belt. The range of the reader is L 
and  is the angle covered by the antenna of the reader. 
 
Figure 5. Model of RFID-based conveyor belt 
The speed of the conveyor belt, Vb, is 2.5m/s which is the 
maximum speed in [22]. Hence, the time an item needs to move 
from A to B, denoted by t, is calculated as (18). 
 
bb V
L
V
AB
t
2
sin2
 (18) 
[1] claimed that the read range varies from nominal range 
of 10cm to extended range of 50cm, so min(L) = 10cm and 
max(L) = 50cm. In addition, theoretically 0 ≤  180, it is 
inferred that 0 ≤ 
2
sin < 1. 
The maximum number of resynchronisation attempts, N is 
computed as (19) and (20) which are the best case scenario and 
worst case scenario respectively. These computations are based 
on (16), (17) and (18). 
0.008
2
θ
sinL
floor
min(T)
t
floorN
 
(19) 
0.011
2
θ
sinL
floor
max(T)
t
floorN
 
(20) 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 shows the value of N in (19) and (20) 
respectively with different values of L and . 
 
Figure 6. Maximum number of attempts to resynchronise a tag for various L 
and  in case of min(T) 
 
Figure 7. Maximum number of attempts to resynchronise a tag for various L 
and  in case of max(T) 
If  = 68  is chosen as a reliable read angle as mentioned in 
[23], the values of N for min(L) = 10cm and max(L) = 50cm, 
are 11 and 57, respectively for the best case scenario or min(T). 
On the other hand, for the worst case scenario or max(T), the 
values are 8 and 42, respectively. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The proposed protocol in this paper is a mutual 
authentication protocol which utilises AES-128 as a primitive 
to encrypt the messages transmitted on the channel. With that 
cipher block, the protocol can protect against many types of 
attacks such as information leakage, tag tracking etc. In 
addition, the secure keys stored in tag and sever are always 
updated in each authentication session, it is impossible for 
attackers to play the replay attack or trace back the previous 
data. 
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